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Note: The Constitutionality of the No-Notice
Provisions of the Uniform Probate Code
The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) provides for the settlement and administration of estates by both formal and informal
procedures and by private action.' Under the formal procedures
of the Code, interested parties2 whose names and addresses are
known must be notified of the settlement of the estate. These
proceedings clearly satisfy the due process notice requirements
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.3
Notification of interested parties is not required, however, under
the informal procedures and the private action authorized by the
Code. Considerable debate has arisen over whether these nonotice provisions 4 violate due process of law. This Note will
examine this issue in light of both the history of statutory notice
requirements in probate proceedings and current developments
in the concept of procedural process.
I. THE NO-NOTICE PROVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE
The American colonies drew their procedures for probating
wills from those originated by the English ecclesiastical courts. 5
A will could be probated in England by common form or solemn
form. 6 Common form probate was an ex parte, summary pro7
ceeding in which no notice was furnished to interested parties.
Interested parties could challenge common form probate, however, by subsequently initiating proceedings in solemn form, or
they could avoid common form probate altogether by initiating
solemn form proceedings in the first instance. Solemn form pro1. See text accompanying notes 31-55 infra.
2.

UNIFomw PROBATE CODE § 1-201(20). That section defines "inter-

ested parties" as heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries and any others having a property right in or claim against" a decedent's estate. Also included are "persons having priority for appointment as personal representative, and other fiduciaries representing interested persons."
3. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
4. See text accompanying notes 56-58 infra.
5. A. RErPY & L. ToMnKNs, THE LAW OF WILLS 159-60 (1948);
Simes, The Function of Will Contests, 44 MIcH. L. REV. 503, 505 (1964).
6. L. Snvms & P. BASYF4 PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 388 (1946).
7. A. REPPY & L. TOMpKINs, supra note 5, at 112.
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bate, regardless of when begun, required notification of all interested parties as well as a formal adversary proceeding to prove
the wfll8 The result of such a proceeding became conclusive im-

mediately, 9 while a result reached in common form remained inconclusive until a period of limitations had expired. 10 Under either approach, English probate proceedings determined succession only to personal property. Title to real property passed automatically to devisees when the testator died. The validity of
the will under these circumstances could be contested, but only
through an action for trespass or ejection. 1
While American courts have adopted the basic English
framework, they nevertheless have made some substantive
changes. The differentiation between land and personalty has
been discarded; American courts in the earliest of cases probated
wills involving devises of land.' 2 A second departure has been
13
the gradual legislative abandonment of common form probate.
Professor Simes has suggested that once the probate courts had
expanded their jurisdiction to include wills concerning realty as
well as personalty, it became inevitable that common form probate would be eliminated.' 4 For although the simpler proceeding
may have been a tolerable mechanism for disposing of estates
consisting only of personalty, its failure to require notice became
especially objectionable where real property was involved. Indeed, Simes observes, prior notification of interested parties is
essential to "the American conception of procedure."' 15 In any
event, it is clear that the tendency of American legislatures has
been to require notice of the probate of wills and the administration of estates.' 0 Not only do modern probate statutes in a sub8. Id. at 112-13; L. SnVIs & P. BASYE, supra note 6, at 439.
9.

A. REPPY & L. TovnPKIns, supra note 5, at 113.

10. Id. Scholars disagree as to whether the period of limitations
was 10 or 30 years. Id. n.136.
11. Id. at 114; L.SImEs & P. BASYE. supra note 6, at 439.
12. A. REPPY & L. TOMPKiNS, supira note 5, at 180; Simes, supra
note 5, at 511.
13. Simes, supra note 5, at 524. See also Wellman, The Uniform.
ProbateCode: Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 CoNN.L. REv. 453, 458
(1970).
14. Simes, supra note 5, at 524.
15. Id.
16. The admission of a will to probate without prior notification of
interested parties should be distinguished from settlement of an estate
without notification at any point in the proceedings, a procedure sanctioned under the no-notice provisions of the UPC. See notes 34-47 infra
and accompanying text.
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stantial majority of states provide for prior notice,' 7 but the num18
ber of states adopting this requirement is steadily increasing.
In most states in which common form probate is still allowed,
notice is required at least at some later stage of the proceedings. 19
The Model Probate Code (M/PC) and the UPC, two comprehensive codifications of probate law,20 represent the most recent
developments relevant to the issue of notice requirements in
probate proceedings. Introduced in 1946, the MPC was the first
major attempt to revise probate law and establish uniform probate procedures among the states. Several states subsequently
amended their laws,21 but no state adopted the MPC in toto.
The MPC retained common form probate, permitting probate and
appointment of a personal representative without prior notification of interested parties. 2 2 Where no prior notice was
given, however, the clerk of court was required to personally
serve or mail notice to all interested parties before the estate
could be finally settled.2 Interested parties were thus accorded
the opportunity to request reconsideration of all matters previously resolved. 24 Under the scheme of the MPC, then, proceedings could be initiated without notice, but the requirement that
subsequent notice be provided in all cases was retained.2 5 De17. Basye, Determination of Heirship, 54 Mica. L. REv. 737, 745
(1956).
18. A survey of state law in 1945 showed that 19 states permitted
the probate of a will without prior notification of interested parties.
Note, Administration of Estates-Requirement of Notice for Probate of
Wills or Grant of Letters of Administration, 43 MIcH. L. REv. 1153, 115556 (1945). A similar survey published in 1952 revealed that the number
of states permitting common form probate had decreased to 17. Levy,
Probate in Common Form in the United States: The Problem of Notice
in Probate Proceedings, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 420, 422 (1952).

19. Simes, The Administration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding In Rem, 43 MicH. L. REV. 675, 694 (1945); Estate Administration: Current Practices and Proposed Uniform Probate Code, 3 REAL PROPERTY,
PROBATE & TRUST L.J. 143 (1968); Note, Requirements of Notice in In

Rem Proceedings, 70 HAsv. L. REv. 1257, 1269 (1957); Comment, 1967

Draft of the Uniform Probate Code, 53 IowA L. Rzv. 508, 516 (1967).

20. The Model Probate Code was a joint project of the University of Michigan Law School and the Real Property, Probate and

Trust Law section of the American Bar Association. The Uniform Probate Code was a continuation of the attempt to unify and modernize probate law. Uniform ProbateCode Approved by Council, 4 REAL PROPERTY,
PROBATE & TRUST L.J. 206, 207 (1969).
21. Id.
22.

MODEL PROBATE CODE

23. Id. § 70.

§ 68 (1946).

24. L. Snvms & P. BAsYE, supra note 6, at 16.
25. MODEL PROBATE CODE §§ 64-81 (1946); Niles, The MPC and Mono-
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spite this approach, the notice provisions of the MPC were labeled inadequate.2 6
The Uniform Probate Code, a continuation of the attempt
to simplify and modernize probate law, has had an immediate
impact on state law. Since the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association
27
adopted it in 1969, the UPC has been enacted in 10 states.
Under certain circumstances, the UPC allows wills to be probated, intestacy to be established, and estates to be administered
28
without prior or subsequent notification of interested parties.
It is readily apparent that the absence of notice provisions in the
UPC constitutes a significant departure from American common
29
law, from existing statutes, and from the MPC.
The substantive aspects of the UPC are simple. The estate
of a decedent "devolves to the persons to whom it is devised
by his last will ... or in the absence of testamentary disposition to his heirs . . . subject to . . . rights of creditors,...
and to administration."3 0 The procedural scheme of the UPC,
however, is complex. A multitude of procedural alternatives are
provided to afford interested parties flexibility in settling estates.
UPC procedures can be grouped into three categories: first,
probate and administration without judicial sanction; second, informal probate and informal appointment of a personal representative; and third, formal testacy proceedings, formal probate,
and formal appointment of a personal representative. These proceedings may be employed in any combination to settle an
estate.8 1 Since the basic premise of the UPC is that the role
graphs on Probate Law: A Review, 45 MICH. L. REV. 321, 327 (1947);
Wellman, supra note 13, at 464. Notice was not required, however, before small estates could be probated. MODEL PROBATE CODE §§ 86-92
(1946).
26. There is a good deal of detail about how notice is to be
given when it is given; but the fact remains that things may be
done in the first instance of which a party who has an interest
in the proceding has no initial notice.
Twyeffort, The Model Probate Code, 22 N.Y.U.L. REv. 63, 67 (1947). But
see Wellman, supra note 13, at 464-65.
27. The 10 states that have enacted the UPC are Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin.
28. See text accompanying notes 31-63 infra.
29. See text accompanying notes 12-26 supra.
30. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-101.
31. Id. § 3-107 & Comment. 'For example, an informally probated
will may be administered by a formally appointed personal representative.
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of the court in settling an estate should be passive, 32 interested
parties themselves must initiate action to make particular Code
procedures operational.3"
The first group of procedures, under which estates may be
settled without any judicial involvement, includes no requirement that notice be provided to interested parties. Once an
estate is settled by private action, if no will is presented for
probate within three years after the death of the decedent,
intestacy and the interests of heirs are irreversibly established
by the mere passage of time.3 4 Furthermore, devisees under an
unprobated will or statutory heirs may divide and distribute the
assets of the estate among themselves without the services of an
appointed personal representative. 35 These options are withdrawn, however, if an interested party petitions within certain
time limits3 6 for formal probate of a will,3

7

formal adjudication

s

of intestacy, or formal appointment of a personal represen39
tative.
The second group of UPC procedures, which provides for
settlement of estates through informal probate of wills40 and
informal appointment of personal representatives,4 1 allows a will
to be proved in a nonjudicial, 4 2 ex parte proceeding. Again,
notification of interested parties is not required. 43 An informally
32. Id. art. MI,General Comment.

33. See, e.g., id. §§ 3-301, 3-401.
34. Id. §§ 3-102 & Comment, 3-108 & Comment, 3-1006 & Comment.
35. Id. §§ 3-107 & Comment; 3-102, Comment; 3-101 & Comment;
3-901 & Comment; art. III, General Comment. The rights to a decedent's property established in section 3-101 are complemented by procedures in sections 3-107 and 3-901 that facilitate distribution without
appointment of a personal representative.
36. Id. § 3-108(3). See also text accompanying note 34 supra.
37. UNioRm PROBATE CoDE § 3-401.
38. Id.
39. Id. § 3-414.
40. Id. § 3-301.
41. Id.
42. Id. § 3-302 & Comment. An interested party applies for informal probate by submitting to a registrar an application containing a
sworn statement that the detailed requirements for an informal probate
petition have been met. Id. § 3-301. On receiving an application, the
registrar does little more than examine the documents to determine
whether they are complete and in conformity with the technical requirements of the Code. Id. § 3-303 (a). If his determination is favorable, the
registrar then issues a written statement of informal probate. The registrar may, in his discretion, decline informal probate, however, even
though all statutory requirements have been met. Id. § 3-305. For definition of "registrar," see note 61 infra.
43. Section 3-306 of the Code requires that notice of informal probate be provided to "(1) any person demanding it pursuant to Section
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probated will is conclusive against all parties unless formal
testacy proceedings are commenced within one year of the proceeding or three years of the death of the testator, whichever
is later.44 If the interested parties elect to utilize a personal
representative, the appointment may be made informally and,
again, without providing notice to interested parties. 45 Although informal appointment proceedings are conducted without
notice, they establish full powers and duties in the personal representative. 40 And while the Code imposes on all personal representatives the duty to inform heirs and devisees of their appointment, failure to do so affects neither the validity of the appoint47
ment nor the powers the personal representative may exercise.
The third group of UPC procedures, which provides for
48
settlement of estates through formal testacy proceedings,
49
formal probate of wills, and formal appointment of personal
representatives, 0 must be conducted under court supervision"' and must be preceded by notification of all interested
parties. 52 A formal testacy proceeding involves adjudication
to determine whether the decedent has left a valid will; 53 the
formal probate of a will bars informal probate of any will of
the decedent. 4 Similarly, formal proceedings for the appointment of a personal representative operate to enjoin the action
of an informally appointed representative. 8
Thus, in three instances the tCPC permits an estate to be
conclusively settled without notification of interested parties.
3-204; and (2) to any personal representative .... No other notice of
informal probate is required."
44.

UNIFOIM PROBATE CODE § 3-108 (3).

45. Section 3-310 of the Code requires that notice of informal appointment proceedings be provided to "(1) any person demanding it pursuant to Section 3-204; and (2) to any person having a prior or equal
right to appointment .... No other notice of an informal appointment
proceeding is required."
46. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-307 (b).
47. Id. § 3-705.
48. Id. § 3-401.
49. Id.
50. Id. § 3-414.
51. "Court" is defined in the Code as "the Court having jurisdiction
in matters relating to decedent's affairs." Id. § 1-201(3).
52. Id. §§ 3-401, 3-414(b).
53. Id. § 3-401.
54. A court in formal testacy proceedings may enjoin or set aside
an informal probate and may decree that the decedent died testate or
intestate. Id.
55. Id.
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The first occurs where there is no will, the three-year period for
presentation expires, and no personal representative is appointed.5 6 The second is the informal probate of a will without
the appointment of a personal representative.5 7 The third occurs
where a will is probated informally or intestacy is established
by the passage of time, and an informally appointed personal
representative fails to give the required notice of his appoint8
ment.5
Two examples illustrate the potential adverse effects of the
no-notice provisions of the UPC. First, a statutory heir may be
deprived of the right to assert his interest in the estate of a
decedent. Assume X dies, leaving a will naming A as sole devisee.
B, X's only living heir, lives several hundred miles away and is
unaware of the death of X. A probates the will informally, and
either does not seek the informal appointment of a personal representative, or the informally appointed representative fails to
notify B of his appointment. If B fails to attempt to set aside the
informal probate by petitioning for a formal proceeding within
three years of the death of X, he will lose the right to assert his
interest in the estate. Second, a devisee may be deprived of the
right to assert his interest. Assume X dies, leaving a will naming his old boyhood chum, B, as sole devisee. B lives in another
part of the country and has been out of touch with A for many
years. A, X's only heir, neither searches for nor finds the will,
or searches for the will and finds it but has reason to believe
that it was properly revoked by X. A takes possession of X's
property and does nothing for three years. If B fails to attempt
to probate the will formally or informally within three years
of the death of X, he loses his rights as devisee.
Since the procedures illustrated in these examples may
deprive interested parties of their rights, and since the selfinterest of the initiating party determines which procedure is
used in settling the estate, 59 the UPC attempts to provide some
safeguards against possible abuses. First, any person injured by
fraud "in connection with" any UPC provision or by fraud
employed to avoid the provisions of the Code may sue for
damages.60 Second, the registrar 61 may decline an application
56. Id. § 3-108.
57. Id. § 3-306.
58. Id. § 3-705.
59. Id. § 3-501, Comment; art. III, General Comment.
60. Id. § 1-106.
61. "'Registrar' refers to the judge of the court or the person designated by the court to perform the functions of Registrar as provided in
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for informal probate.6 2 Third, every personal representative
3
must notify all known heirs and devisees of his appointment.
II. DUE PROCESS AND NO-NOTICE PROBATE
Courts in several early state and federal cases indicated that
common form probate and probate after constructive notice satisfied the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment.64 These courts emphasized the interests of the state in
closing estates65 and, primarily, the in rem nature of probate proceedings. 66 While courts cannot exercise in personam jurisdiction unless the parties are notified of the attempted exercise of
jurisdiction and of their right to appear and be heard, 7 courts
in early nonprobate cases 68 exercised in rem jurisdiction based
on their control over the res coupled with a minimal form of notice. 69 And since parties in probate proceedings sought to establish clear title to property located within the territorial limits
71
of a state,70 such proceedings were classified as in rem.
The Supreme Court in modern due process decisions has
recognized, however, that the constraints of in rem jurisdiction
afford inadequate due process protection to litigants; it has therefore separated the issue of jurisdiction over the res from that
of notice. Thus, in Mulane v. Central Hanover Trust Co. 72 the
section 1-307," id. § 1-201(36), which provides that the acts and orders
performable by the registrar "shall be performed by a judge of the court
or by a person, including the clerk, designated by the court by a written
order filed and recorded in the office of the court." Id. § 1-307. See
note 42 supra.
62. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 3-305 (1946).
63. Id. § 3-705.
64. Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356 (1915); Farrell v.
O'Brien, 199 U.S. 89 (1905); Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U.S. 608 (1883);
Case of Broderick's Will, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503 (1874); Darby's Lessee
v. Mayer, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 465, 468 (1825); Knight v. Hollings, 73
N.J. 495, 500, 63 A. 38, 41 (1906). See also Comment, Probate Proceed-

ings-The Mullane Case and Due Process of Law, 50 Micn. L. REv. 124,

132-33 (1951).
65. Case of Broderick's Will, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503, 509 (1874).
66. Id. at 519.
67. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928). See Note, Requirements
of Notice in In Rem Proceedings, 70 HAav. L. REv. 1257 (1957).
68. E.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). See also Note,
supra note 67, at 1257.
69. Note, supra note 67, at 1261; Comment, supra note 64, at 127.
70. Note, supra note 67, at 1260.
71. See Case of Broderick's Will, 8, U.S. (21 Wall.) 503, 509 (1874).
72. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The Mullane case involved the administration of a trust. A state statute provided that a trust company could ob-
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Court explicitly rejected the notion that notice is somehow satisfied by the metaphysical qualities of in rem jurisdiction and focused instead on the extent to which notice is actually calculated
to reach interested parties. 3 Since Mullane, lower courts have
properly disregarded in rem characterizations and rather have
determined whether the particular notice was adequate.7 4 And
although the Supreme Court has yet to deal specifically with notice requirements in probate proceedings,75 it has applied the
Mullane standard in analogous situations.76
The existence in any form of a notice requirement, however,
depends on whether the particular interest for which such protection is sought is within the range of those constitutionally recognized interests the deprivation of which must be attended by
procedural due process. In probate proceedings, then, the initial
issue to be resolved is whether the interest of heirs and devisees
in succeeding to the estate of a decedent is "property" within the
7
meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
The Constitution itself contains no requirement that legislatures provide for succession to the estates of decedents. Moreover, a citizen has no absolute right to dispose of his property

by will:
Though the general consent of the most enlightened nations has,
from the earliest historical period, recognized a natural right of
children to inherit the property of their parents, we know of no
legal principle to prevent the legislature from taking away or
tain a judicially approved settlement of its accounts after merely publishing notice of the hearing to be held for that purpose. The Supreme
Court held that this procedure deprived beneficiaries, whose whereabouts
were known, of their property rights, and therefore violated due process
of law.
73. Id. at 312. See Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112
(1956). See also Developments in the Law--State-Court Jurisdiction,73
HARV. L. REv. 909, 989 (1960).

74. See, e.g., Cordner v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 234 F. Supp. 765
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
75. State courts, however, have discussed the application of Mullane
to probate proceedings. See, e.g., In re Pierce's Estate, 245 Iowa 22, 60
N.W.2d 894 (1953); New York Merchandise Co. v. Stout, 43 Wash. 2d
825, 264 P.2d 863 (1953). But see Comment, 1967 Draft of Uniform Probate Code, 53 IowA L. R.Ev. 508 (1967); Comment, Adequacy of Process,
32 WAsH. L. Rsv. 165, 178-79 (1957).

76. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (eminent domain proceeding); City of New York v. New York, N.H. &
H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293 (1953) (Bankruptcy Act proceeding). See also Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAnv. L. REV. 909,
989-91 (1960).
77. "[NJor shall any State deprive any person of ... property,
without due process of law.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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limiting the right of testamentary disposition or imposing such
conditions on its exercise as it may deem conducive to the
public good.78

Nevertheless, the interest of an heir or devisee in succeeding to
the estate of a decedent may be vested by statute. The UPC,
for example, provides:
[Uipon the death of a person, his real and personal property devolves to the persons to whom it is devised by his last will
.. or in the absence of testamentary disposition, to his heirs
*

.

79

Thus, states adopting the UPC have created a statutory right to
inherit.
Rights that originate in statutes have gained constitutional
status in recent Supreme Court decisions-decisions in which the
Court has repeatedly found that statutorily created interests are
property that must be afforded the protections of procedural due
process.8 0 Thus, the absence of a constitutional right to inherit
is of no moment for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. The
UPC nevertheless purports to limit the right to inherit by subjecting it to the no-notice provisions:
The power of a person to leave property by will, and the rights
of creditors, devisees, and heirs to his property are subject to
the restrictions and limitations contained in this Code to facilitate the final settlement of estates.3 1

In limiting the right it creates, the UPC runs afoul of the
Constitution. Since a protected property interest is at stake in
proceedings for the settlement of an estate, the fundamental
requirements of due process must be observed. Minimally, then,
interested parties must be notified cf the settlement of the estate
and must be accorded the opportunity to be heard at the probate
proceeding.
UPC proponents reject this analysis of the requirements of
procedural due process and advance several arguments in support
of the no-notice provisions of the Code. They argue first that the
UPC contains various protective devices that make notice unnecessary.8 2 These devices are the antifraud provision, 3 the power
78. United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 628 (1896).
79. UIFoRM PROBATE CODE § 3-101.
80. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (employment rights of untenured faculty); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971) (driver's license and motor vehicle registration); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (statutory entitlement of qualified person to
welfare benefits).
81.

UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

§ 3-101.

82. Manlin & Martens, Informal Proceedings under the Uniform
Probate Code: Notice and Due Process, 3 J.L. REFORMV 39, 46-50 (1969).
83. UNFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-106.
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of the registrar to decline an application for informal probate,8 4
and the requirement that every personal representative notify
all known heirs and devisees of his appointment. 85
Protective devices alone, however, cannot rebut a con-

stitutional challenge to the notice provisions of the UPC. If a
procedure is constitutionally defective because it fails to provide
adequate notice, only "notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
86
action" will cure that defect.
Moreover, these protective devices can be criticized on practical grounds as simply inadequate and unworkable. The antifraud provision, for example, is clearly inadequate since the
fraud action must be initiated by the very party who has been
deprived of notice.8 7 If that party does not discover the fraud,
the remedy is meaningless. In addition, a fraud action may be
difficult to prove-to recover on a fraud theory, a devisee who
failed to assert a timely claim under a will must prove that the

statutory heirs knew of the existence of the will.88

Even if

Id. § 3-305.
85. Id. § 3-705.
86. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
87. UNIFoRM PROBATE CODE § 1-105.
88. The UPC provides a cause of action to any person injured by
fraud in connection with any proceeding or any statement filed under the
Code or by fraud employed in circumvention of the provisions of the
Code. Id. § 1-106. The Code fails to define fraud, however, and, as a
result, it is unclear what, if anything, this section adds to existing common-law or statutory fraud actions.
A common-law deceit action is based on a false representation made
by the defendant and knowledge or belief on his part that the represen84.

tation is false. W. PRossER, TaE LAW

OF

ToRTs 685 (1971).

Where statu-

tory heirs succeed to an estate through intestacy established by the passage of time no representations with respect to the existence of a will
are made. A common-law deceit action would therefore be unavailable.
In some jurisdictions, however, nondisclosure of facts of which the defendant has knowledge can serve as the basis for a fraud action. Id.
at 695. This is particularly true where the relationship of the parties
is a fiduciary one, such as that of executor and beneficiary of an estate.
Murphy v. Cartwright, 202 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1953). But it is doubtful
that statutory heirs would be held fiduciaries of potential devisees.
Even assuming that the less stringent definition of fraud applies to actions under the UPC, devisees would still be required to prove that heirs
had knowledge of the undisclosed fact, i.e., the existence of a will.
The language of the UPC section providing a cause of action where
fraud is used to avoid or "circumvent the provisions of the Code . .. "
UNIFoRM PROBATE CODE § 1-106, does not alter the forgoing analysis and

conclusions.

Statutory heirs succeeding to an estate through intestacy

established by the passage of time are not required to search for a will
or disclose its existence if one is found.
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knowledge were proven, the heirs might successfully defend on
the ground that they reasonably believed the will had been revoked.8 9 Finally, the antifraud provision is an inadequate remedy since fraud victims in some cases cannot recover specific estate property. Distributees who improperly obtain property of
an estate through a personal representative may convey good title to the property, 90 and purchasers are protected even though
they failed to inquire into the propriety of the distribution."
The power of the registrar to deny informal probate is also
a meaningless protection. The registrar may merely be a clerk
who examines informal probate petitions to determine if they
are complete.92 Even though he has the statutory power to reject
complete petitions, it is of little value as a protective device, since
he has neither statutory standards on which to base his decisions
93
nor independent investigatory powers.
The final protective device, the requirement that personal
representatives notify interested parties of their appointment, is
inadequate for two reasons: first, the appointment of a personal
representative is itself not required, 94 and second, the failure
of an appointed representative to provide notice affects neither
the validity of his appointment nor his powers.9 5
UPC proponents also argue that due process requirements
are fixed by common-law practice. Since the informal procedures of the Code resemble common form probate as it existed
both in England and in colonial America, proponents maintain
that informal probate cannot be violative of due process.9 6
89. See note 88 supra.
90. UNIFoRoV PROBATE CODE §§ 3-907 to -910 & Comments.

91. Id. § 3-910. Purchasers are protected only if a personal representative distributes or releases the property. A personal representative
has the power to distribute or release property even though he fails to
notify heirs and devisees of his appointment. Id. § 3-705. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
92. See note 42 supra.
93. See UlNomvm PROBATE CODE § 3-305 & Comment. It is highly
unlikely that the registrar would learn of the existence of interested and
uninformed parties by merely examining the petition.
94. Id. § 3-705, Comment.
95. Id. § 3-705.
96. See L. Snums & P. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 506, 511-12
(1946); Manlin & Martens, supra note 82, at 52-55; Developments in the
Law--State-Court Jurisdiction,73 HARv. L. REV. 909, 990 (1960); Com-

ment, Probate Proceedings-The Mullane Case and Due Process of Law,
50 MIcH. L. REV. 124, 132-33 (1951).
99, 110 (1921):

See also Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S.

19761

NO-NOTICE PROVISIONS

Although informal probate does resemble its common-law
antecedent, the two differ in one significant respect: the length
of time during which a will may be contested.'
And while
authorities disagree over the period of limitations at common
law, the shortest estimate is 10 years.98 The UPC, however,
makes an informally probated will conclusive one year after it
is accepted by the registrar or three years after the testator dies,
whichever is later.99 In light of the localized social structure of
seventeenth-century England, a 10-year statute of limitations was
very long. Family members in the small, nonmobile English
society lived in close proximity, enhancing the possibility that
notice actually would be received. In a large, mobile society such
as contemporary America, where family members often are
separated by great distances, a one- to three-year statute of limitations not only is actually shorter, but relatively shorter as well.
It must be noted that of the two most significant no-notice
provisions of the UPC-intestacy established by the passage of
time and informal probate-only the latter has any historical
precedent. But even if it were conceded that each of the nonotice provisions of the UPC has a direct analogue in English
common law,100 constitutionality of the provisions would remain
problematical. Due process of law is a dynamic concept-if every
procedure followed in seventeenth-century England were allowed to control American jurisprudence, there would be little
change or improvement in the law.101 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has declared that the legitimacy accorded certain
procedures under English common law should not be considered
in defining contemporary due process requirements if those procedures were not followed in this country after it gained indeA procedure customarily employed, long before the Revolution, in the commercial metropolis of England, and generally
adopted by the states as suited to their circumstances and needs,
cannot be deemed inconsistent with due process of law.
97. See notes 6-10 supra and accompanying text.
98. See note 10 supra.
99. UiuroRM PROBATE CODE § 3-108.
100. Intestacy by passage of time lacks historical precedent because
American courts had full control over intestate succession. Intestacy
simply could not be established without the aid of a court. See Wellman,
The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 ComNN.
L. REv. 453, 460 (1970).

101. It does not follow, however, that a procedure settled in English law at the time of the emigration, and brought to this country and practiced by our ancestors, is an essential element of

due process of law. If that were so the procedure of the first
half of the seventeenth century would be fastened upon the
American jurisprudence like a straight jacket ....
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:317

pendence. 1c 2 Since the American colonies made substantial
changes in English probate proceedings, including the rejection
in several colonies of common form probate, 10 3 the English probate procedures can be regarded as unsuited to the civil and political conditions of the United States, and therefore not determinative of constitutional due process requirements.
Supporters of the UPC have also argued that interested
parties are protected inasmuch as they may contest or appeal
the initial ex parte decision within the one- to three-year period
of limitations. 10 4 Their position is simply that informal probate is not in itself final. A temporary deprivation of an interest
in an estate, they assert, does not run counter to the requirements of procedural due process. 10 5 The Supreme Court has
held, however, that even temporary deprivations of property
interests are deprivations within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment.' °6 Moreover, the Court also has dealt specifically
with the effect of a statute of limitations on the requirements
of due process. In Schroeder v. City of New York' 07 it held
that posted notice of condemnation proceedings failed to satisfy
due process requirements and that a statutory time period during which land owners could appeal the condemnation decision
failed to cure the constitutionally defective notice. Schroeder
has been cited for the proposition -that the lack of finality afforded by a statute of limitations will not be an adequate defense
102. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932).

103. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.

104. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
105. See Manlin &Martens, supra note 82, at 55-57.
106. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In a more recent case,
however, seizure of property without prior notice and hearing was permitted. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974). The Supreme Court
in Mitchell upheld a Louisiana statute permitting a mortgagee or lien
holder to obtain a writ of sequestration to prevent waste or alienation
of encumbered property. Such a writ could be obtained on ex parte application without notifying the debtor or affording him an opportunity

to be heard.

The statutory scheme involved in the Mitchell case can be distinguished from the no-notice provisions of the UPC, however, since the
Louisiana statute provided for mandatory notice and hearing immediately following seizure of the property:
Under Louisiana procedure... the debtor, Mitchell was not
left in limbo to await a hearing that might or might not "eventually" occur, as he was under the statutory schemes before the
Court in Fuentes.
Id. at 618. Under UPC procedures there is no assurance that interested parties ever will be notified. The no-notice provisions permit estates to be conclusively settled without notice. See text accompanying
notes 56-58 supra.
107. 371U.S. 208 (1962).
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against a due process attack based on an assertion of inadequate
notice.10 8
Aside from its weakness as a constitutional doctrine, there
are serious practical problems with the "lack of finality" argument as well. The three-year period for challenging or initiating
probate is of little utility to a party who, because of lack of notice,
is simply unaware of the fact that his interests are at stake.10 9
Proponents of the UJPC argue further that death provides
natural notice of probate proceedings. 10 The obvious answer
to the "natural notice" argument is that the contemplated notice
does not satisfy the Mullane requirement of notice "reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action.""' Distant collateral heirs,
2
for example, may not learn of the death of their relative"
and, even if they do, might assume that they have no interest
in the estate. The problem is most acute for devisees. Charitable institutions, in particular, are frequently named in wills prepared by persons unknown to them. Thus it cannot be said that
they receive automatic notice of their interest through the death
of a testator.
Yet another argument is that some of the UPC proceedings
are nonadjudicative and therefore not subject to due process
requirements." 3 Its proponents base this argument on the
108. See Boyd, Some Suggestions for a Model Estates Code, 47
Alum. L. Rev. 787, 801-02 (1963); Comment, 1967 Draft of Uniform Probate Code, 53 IOWA L. REv. 508, 514 n.44 (1967). But see Manlin &
Martens, supra note 82, at 57.
109. Cf. text accompanying note 87.
110. See Manlin & Martens, supra note 82, at 56.
111. 339 U.S. at 314.
112. One statistical analysis suggests that approximately 13 percent
of all estates involve no known kin or collateral kin only. Wellman,
Probate Bonds and the Uniform Probate Code, in U.P.C. KEY MAN SErMNAR 121, 126 (1970). In a large, mobile society where family members
frequently are separated by long distances, the "natural" notice of death
cannot be said to be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise" collateral heirs of probate proceedings. Cf. text accompanying notes 98-101 supra.
Collateral heirs have a direct interest in an estate to which they
may succeed through the laws of intestacy. In Mullane, the Supreme
Court held that notice by publication was constitutionally sufficient for
those trust beneficiaries whose interests were conjectural or contingent.
306 U.S. at 317. Collateral heirs are analogous to contingent trust beneficiaries so long as there exist lineal heirs with priority over them. But
where the collateral heirs have priority under the laws of intestacy, their
interest is direct and must be accorded due process protection. See note
124 infra.
113. See Wellman, supra note 100, at 463-67.
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notion that the registrar, who oversees the informal probate of
wills, has the limited, nonjudicial function of administering the
nonadjudicative proceedings under the Code.' 4 To label an
official as a registrar and describe his functions as "nonjudicial"
is not determinative of constitutionality, however. The Supreme
Court consistently has disregarded form and examined the
character and effects of the action taken to determine its true
nature;" 5 the controlling factor in characterizing a proceeding
as judicial or nonjudicial is whether it is accorded finality when
an interested party fails to appeal." 6 Since informal probate
and private settlement of estates are, at the latest, conclusive
three years after the death of the decedent," 7 they clearly have
8
the same effect as adjudicative proceedings."
The provisions for settlement of estates without any contact
with a court further demonstrate the view of the UPC drafters
that succession to the estate of a decedent should not be a matter
for judicial resolution unless the intervention of a court is
requested by an interested party." 9 This manner of settlement cannot necessarily escape the requirements of due process
simply by virtue of its private nature. When the effect of
private action is to bring about that which could be proscribed
if accomplished through state action, the state may violate due
1 20
process by making its courts available to enforce such action.
114. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 1-307; 3-105; art. HI, pt. 3.
115. "Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined by its character, and not by the character of the agent." Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879).
116. One ground urged for exception to the need for notice is
that the settlement of... accounts was in the nature of an
"administrative and ministerial" function rather than "judicial"
in character ....
But the defendant's insistence that the
decrees ... were judgments with all the attributes of binding

effect and conclusiveness ... concedes the judicial character
of the proceeding.
Hollis v. Tilton, 5 A.2d 29, 34 (N.H. 1939).
117. UNIuoM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-103, 3-1006.
118. The heirs at law ... have the right to be present at the
hearing; and if they are not notified thereof, and an order is
made without giving them an opportunity to be heard ...
they would stand in very much the same position as if a judgment had been rendered against them without bringing them
into court, and giving them an opportunity to answer or defend.
In re Estate of Charlebois, 6 Mont 373, 376, 12 P. 775, 777 (1887).
119. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE art. II, General Comment.
120. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Admittedly, this
argument depends on a broad interpretation of Shelley. It seems, however, that court action sanctioning a deprivation of property that might
have never occurred but for the infirmities that inhere in a statutory
scheme might be prohibited even under a more narrow reading of that
opinion.
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Moreover, the private action provisions of the UPC may not be
"private" at all.

Since such action becomes final by operation
of law, it seems to constitute state action in its purest sense.
Thus, inasimuch as the IJPC provides that passing of title by private action is enforceable in the courts, due process must be
21
observed.
Finally, proponents argue that a strong state interest in the
settlement of decedents' estates justifies the no-notice provisions
of the UPC.122 The drafters of the Code take the position
that the public interest in speed, efficiency, and lower costs in
settling estates outweighs the interests of heirs and beneficiaries in receiving notice. 123 The Supreme Court, however, has
applied a balancing test to determine both the form of notice
that satisfies the requirements of due process 2 4 and when that
121. An additional state action argument can be made by drawing
a parallel between the provisions of the UPC that do away with a
judicial sanction requirement and another state statutory scheme that
sought to do the same thing. In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967),
the Supreme Court held that a referendum to amend the California constitution to prohibit the state from imposing any limitation on the right
of a person to dispose of his real property was state action. The Court
expressed particular concern that the amendment would have encouraged racial discrimination, since it would have repealed a prior law expressly prohibiting such discrimination.
In most non-UPC states, present law provides that estates must be
settled in judicial proceedings. Since to eliminate such requirements
would be to encourage deprivation of property without due process of
law, the analogy to Reitman seems appropriate.
122. There is undeniably a strong public interest in rapid and efficient succession to the estates of decedents. See Case of Broderick's Will,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503, 509 (1874).
123. Wellman, supra note 100, at 566.
124. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950),
the Supreme Court balanced the interest of the state in settling trust accounts against the interest of trust beneficiaries in receiving notice that
accounts were being closed. Id. at 313-14. It held that mailed notice was
required for trust beneficiaries whose names and addresses were known
or ascertainable with reasonable effort. Id. at 318. Published notice was
held sufficient for beneficiaries whose names and addresses were unknown and could not be ascertained with reasonable effort, and for contingent or conjectural beneficiaries. Id. at 317. The Court justified minimal forms of notice for the latter two categories of beneficiaries on the
theory that the practical difficulties and cost involved in identifying
large numbers of beneficiaries with only remote interests in the trusts
were prohibitive.
The Mullane balancing test for determining the form of notice necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process is directly applicable to
cases involving the settlement of estates. The state interest in settling
estates is similar to the state interest in settling trust accounts. The
practical difficulties of notifying the parties interested in an estate are
similar to those encountered in notifying trust beneficiaries whose names
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notice must be provided. 12 5 Never has the Court permitted
the deprivation of a substantial property interest without any
notice.
Adherence to due process notice requirements in probate
proceedings undoubtedly will increase costs and possibly will
reduce the speed and efficiency of some procedures under the
UPC,126 but the difference may not be significant. 12 7 For
example, the registrar could mail required notice to interested
parties at a minimal cost. Such a requirement would not affect
the ability8 to probate a will without the services of an
2
attorney.
Simple adjustments to UPC procedures should be viewed as
a necessary and desirable consequence of constitutional fidelity.
Perhaps the benefits are less easily quantified than speed and
efficiency, but they are equally important-rightful heirs and
devisees will not be disenfranchised and the risk of fraud or
mistake in settling estates will be reduced.
and addresses are known or reasonably ascertainable. The cost of notifying interested parties of the settlement of a single estate generally
would be much lower, however, than the cost of notifying beneficiaries
of the 113 pooled trusts involved in Mullane. The Mullane balancing
test, applied to pending probate proceedings, therefore leads to the conclusion that notice reasonably calculated to inform those interested persons whose names are known or reasonably ascertainable is compelled
by due process.
125. The Supreme Court in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600
(1974), balanced the interest of a creditor holding a vendor's lien against
the possessory interest of the purchaser of goods and held that seizure
of the goods through a writ of sequestration did not violate due process.
Id. at 607. The Court reasoned that although no prior notice was provided and no hearing was held, the vendee was adequately protected
because he had been notified of a hearing to be held immediately after
the seizure. Id. at 602. Moreover, the statutory requirement that the
creditor post a bond afforded further protection to the vendee. Id. at
608.
The holding in the Mitchell case might be applied in the probate
context to permit distribution of property prior to notification of inter-

ested parties. It cannot be relied on, however, as authority for deprivations of property without either prior or subsequent notice. And unlike
the sequestration statute at issue in Mitchell, the UPC does not require
a personal representative to post a bond before distributing the assets of
an estate. See UNIomM PROBATE CODE § 3-603.
126. Wellman, supra note 100, at 498-99.
127. Developments in the Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 H4Anv.
L. REv. 909, 990-91 (1960).

128. The registrar would inform the petitioner of the notice requirement and instruct him to make reasonable efforts to compile a list of
the names and addresses of interested pesons. This added requirement
is neither confusing nor complicated, and would not require the assistance of an attorney.
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Requiring that interested parties be notified of probate
proceedings might yield an additional benefit. It might encourage lawyers to recommend the use of the streamlined, informal
procedures of the UPC rather than the costly and time-consuming formal procedures. The greatest single advantage of formal
procedures is certainty. To the extent that notice requirements
for informal procedures lessen the possibility of a challenge to
those procedures by an unnotified interested party, their relative
desirability will be enhanced. 129
Not since the turn of the century has the Supreme Court
addressed the question of the constitutionality of no-notice probate; in fact, it has expressly reserved the issue. 30 One explanation for this inattention is that since virtually all states require
some form of notice at some point in probate proceedings, the
issue simply has not arisen. 1 31 A related second explanation is
that probate notice requirements have been strengthened through
legislative responses to modem Supreme Court due process decisions in other areas of the law. 13 2 Hence, the Court simply has
had little opportunity to rule on the question. 138
The advent of the UPC at this point in the development of
the law of procedural due process makes its notice provisions particularly vulnerable to judicial attack. Since most state probate

codes do not now permit the settlement of estates without notification of interested parties at some stage of the proceedings, 134
129. The Code might be amended to shorten the period during which
informal proceedings may be contested by interested persons who received actual notice of the informal proceeding.
130. The constitutional validity of no-notice probate was the focal
point of the briefs of both parties in Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71
(1909), but the Court "put aside" the question of "whether or not the
State of California did or did not possess arbitrary power in respect to
the character and length of notice to be given of the various steps in
the administration of an estate in the custody of one of its courts," id.
at 81, and decided the case on other grounds.
131. Comment, Probate Proceedings-Administrationof Decedents'
Estates-The Mullane Case and Due Process of Law, 50 M:icH. L. REv.
124, 132 (1951).

132. See Boyd, Constitutional, Treaty and Statutory Requirements
of Probate Notice to Consuls and Aliens, 47 IowA L. B.v. 29, 83 n.222
(1961); Hackney, The Unconstitutionalityof the Notice Provision of the
Texas Probate Code, 23 Sw. L.J. 890 (1969); Kroncke, A Decade of Probate Law, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 82, 99-100; Stiller & Redden, Reform in
the Administrationof Estates,29 MD. , REv. 85 (1969).
133. The current notice requirement in proceedings for the settlement of estates is substantially embodied in statutory law rather than
in case law. Tilley, The Mullane Case: New Notice Requirements, 30
MxcH. ST. B.J., Jan. 1951, at 12, 15; see, Wellman, supra note 100, at 449.
134. See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
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enactment of the UPC in its recommended form would result
in a significant weakening of notice requirements--a reversal of
the trend over the past two centuries toward stronger notice
requirements in probate proceedings. 13 5 Coupled with the fact
that the UPC no-notice provisions are inconsistent with recent
Supreme Court due process decisions, 13 6 this result should elicit
a response from the Court halting the new trend and restoring
pre-UPC notice requirements. Existing case law clearly would
support a ruling that the UPC no-notice provisions are unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court itself has suggested that due process
requires that probate proceedings include some form of notice.13 7 And lower federal courts have more clearly held that
no-notice probate violates due process. At issue in Stevens v.
United States 38 was a federal statute that provided for vesting
the property of a deceased veteran in the Board of Managers
of National Homes for Disabled Soldiers if the veteran had been
living in a soldiers' home at the time of his death and if the
property was not claimed by heirs or next of kin within five
years. The statute, however, did not require that heirs and
devisees be notified that the veteran had died. The wife and
daughter of a veteran claimed part of his estate nine years after
his death. They argued that the five-year statute of limitations
did not bar their claim since the lack of notice violated due
process. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed:
135. See Basye, Determination of Heirship, 54 MICH. L. REv. 727
(1956). Enactment of the UPC without amendment of its notice provisions may disprove the prediction of one writer that there would be no
return to no-notice probate. Levy, Probate in Common Form in the
United States: The Problem of Notice in Probate Proceedings, 1952
Wis. L. REv. 420.
136. See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256, 268 (1896). In Scott

v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34 (1894), a man who had disappeared for several

years discovered when he returned that his estate had been settled. He
thereupon challenged the settlement, arguing that he had not been notified of the proceedings. The Supreme Court voided the probate proceedings on the ground that the probate court lacked jurisdiction. Since the
Court did not separate the issues of jurisdiction and notice, it is unclear
whether the probate court lacked jurisdiction because the man was not
dead or because he had not received notice.
The Scott case has been interpreted, however, as supporting the
proposition that a state statute that permits probate proceedings to be
concluded against a person who has not been notified of those proceedings violates due process. Fratcher, Sovereign Immunity in ProbateProceedings, 31 Mo. L. REv. 127, 138 (1966).
138. 89 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 302 U.S.

623 (1938).
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It seems to us that if Congress had the power to legislate concerning the devolution of personal property... it should have
provided for the giving of notice of his death by publication
and otherwise, so that the heirs or next of kin would at least
have an opportunity to assert a claim ...

within the period of

five years; and that in no event should they be deprived of
their rights in the estate of the deceased member without notice
and an opportunity to assert a claim. 139

Lack of notice was also held fatal in Fennell v. United
States.1 40 There the estate of the decedent contained a war
risk insurance policy payable to the estate, but providing that
if the holder had no heirs, the proceeds would escheat to the
United States. Although the probate court determined that the
plaintiff was the sole heir, the United States Government had
not been notified of the impending settlement of the estate. As
a result, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit voided the
proceeding.
A district court reached a similar conclusion in De Tenorio
v. McGowan.141 In that case, a decedent died intestate in Honduras and was survived by heirs living there. Before his death,
the decedent had given his brother permission to occupy and
farm land that he owned in Mississippi. No proceedings were
instituted in Mississippi to settle the estate. Eleven years after
the death of the decedent, his brother initiated proceedings to
confirm title to the land. Since the heirs in Honduras were not
notified of these proceedings, the court held that they were
deprived of due process and that the confirmation was void.
III. AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
The courts are not the only scene of debate over no-notice
probate; even if a Supreme Court ruling on its constitutionality
is not forthcoming, the no-notice provisions will continue to affect acceptance of the Uniform Probate Code by state legislatures. Several states have adopted the substantive aspects of the
UPC, while altering a number of its procedural forms. 142 In
seven of the 10 states enacting the UPC,' 43 some or all of the
no-notice provisions have been amended.1 44 In six of the 10
139. Id. at 153.

140.
141.
F.2d 92
142.

67 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1933).
364 F. Supp. 1051 (SD. Miss. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 510
(5th Cir. 1975).
1974 Legislation on Trusts and Estates, 10 rAL PRoPERT, PRoBATE &TRuST L.J. 74 (1975).
143. See note 27 supra.
144. The seven states in which one or more of the no-notice provi-
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states, a requirement that notice be mailed to interested parties
has been added to the provisions for informal probate.145 Conclusive establishment of intestacy by the mere passage of time
has been barred in three states. 146 Notification of the informal
appointment of a personal representative has been added as a requirement in two states.147 In only three of the 10148 UPC states
have all proposed no-notice provisions been enacted.
While the legislatures of the seven amending states have
strengthened the notice provisions of the Code and narrowed the
scope of the no-notice provisions, none has completely eliminated
all no-notice provisions. The frequency of deviation from the
proposed provisions demonstrates that the drafters of the Code
seriously miscalculated the commitment of state legislatures to
provide constitutionally adequate notice in probate proceedings.
Those legislatures that have yet to act on the UPC undoubtedly
will continue the pattern of altering the no-notice provisions. A
comprehensive scheme of amendments to the UPC, designed to
eliminate the no-notice provisions, should deal with the conclu49
sive establishment of intestacy by the mere passage of time,
informal probate, 50 and informal appointment of personal
representatives.' 85 Moreover, the scope of notice required in
formal proceedings' 52 should be strengthened.
The conclusive establishment of intestacy by the mere passage of time'53 is one of the unconstitutional no-notice provisions of the Code. Elimination of this provision would leave
formal testacy proceedings as the only method of establishing
intestacy. 5 4 To require elaborate formal proceedings in every
sions have been amended are Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Minnesota, Mon-

tana, Nebraska, and Wisconsin.
145. ARZ. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 14-3108 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974); COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-12-306 (1963); InAO CODE § 15-3-303(a) (Supp.
1975); MiNN. STAT. § 524.3-306 (1974); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2220 et seq.
(Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 865.05 (Supp. 1975).
146. Apiz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 14-3108 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 94A-3-108 (Spec. Supp. 1975); NEB. REv. STAT. § 302414 (Supp. 1975).

147. MiNN. STAT. § 524.3-310 (1974); ITEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2220 (Supp.
1975).
148. The three states that have not altered the no-notice provisions
are Alaska, North Dakota, and South Dakota.
149. UNIFom PROBATE CODE §§ 3-108, 3-1006.
150. Id. § 3-306.
151. Id. § 3-310.
152. Id. § 3-403.
153. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
154. UqizoRomv PROBATE CODE § 3-401; art. III, General Comment (8).
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instance, however, would be inconsistent with the UPC goals of
flexibility and variety of available procedures. 55 A solution
to this dilemma would be to add a new section providing for
informal determinations of intestacy. This procedure could be
modeled after the existing procedure for informal probate of
wills.'" An application for an informal determination of intestacy would be required to contain a statement that, after reasonable efforts, the applicant was unable to discover the existence
of a will.1 '7 The applicant would also be required to make a dili-

gent search for the names and addresses of all heirs. Finally,
notice of the informal intestacy proceedings would have to be
mailed to all interested parties whose names and addresses are
reasonably ascertainable. 158
The UPC procedure for informal probate of wills'"5 is also
unconstitutional. Again, this defect can be corrected by simply
requiring that notice of an informal probate be mailed to all
interested parties.10 0
Also unconstitutional as it now operates is the procedure for
informal appointment of personal representatives.' 6' Notification of the informal appointment of a personal representative
should be mailed to all interested parties. That notice, if provided at the time of the appointment, would render harmless
some otherwise objectionable provisions of the Code. The provision making the powers of an informally appointed personal representative effective despite failure to notify heirs and devisees
following the appointment 0 2 would no longer be troublesome if
there were a requirement that notice precede the informal appointment proceedings. Similarly, the provision permitting a
personal representative to close an estate without notifying interested parties' 03 could be retained so long as notice of his appointment had been provided at the outset.
Finally, the provisions for notice under the formal proceedings of the UPC must be strengthened to satisfy the requirements
of due process. Presently, notice of formal testacy proceedings
must be provided to all heirs and to devisees named in any will
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. art. I, General Comment.
Id. §§ 3-301 to -306.
Cf. id. § 3-301(2) (iii).
See note 124 supra.
See text accompanying notes 40-44 supra.
See note 124 supra.
See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
UxNORM PROBATE CODE § 3-705.
Id. § 3-1003.
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that has been or is being probated. 64 But notification of parties named in an unprobated, competing will, the existence of
which is known by the petitioners, is not required. 6 5 This omission should be remedied, for it is clear in light of Mullane that
notification of such devisees is constitutionally compelled if their
names and addresses are known or can be reasonably ascer66
tained.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

The no-notice provisions of the UPC represent a significant
departure from common law, existing statutes, and the Model
Probate Code. In light of modern developments in the concept of
procedural due process, the constitutionality of these provisions
is at best questionable. State legislatures should continue to
adopt the UPC, but at the same time they must correct constitutional deficiencies by amending the no-notice provisions.

164. Id. § 3-403.
165. Id. § 3-403, Comment.
166. See note 124 supra.

